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In recent years, political forces from the Occupy movement in North America to the #FeesMustFall 
student protest in South Africa have attempted to disrupt the political order in the name of 
democratic equality. Inspired by radical theorists like Rancière, this politics promises a model of 
social change through the combination of the disruption of institutions and the reinvention of daily 
life and political subjectivities. I argue that this radical politics comes with significant limits if it 
ignores the requirement to build more inclusive policies and new institutions too. This is because 
disruption alone may extend exclusion by prompting more elite coercion and popular backlash. This 
claim is illustrated through the example of the #FeesMustFall movement. What is needed instead is a 
radical politics that also includes a clear theoretical focus on policy and institutional change, such as is 
contained in Hamilton’s account of freedom as power through representation. 
 
Introduction 
Recent years have seen the rise of radical political philosophy associated with names like Cavell, 
Žižek, and Rancière that has come to replace the debates at the turn of the century between 
what Žižek describes as traditionalist communitarians (Taylor), modern universalists 
(Habermas and Rawls), and postmodern dispersionists (Lyotard).1 Criticizing these 
approaches for reducing the political in favor of some account of pre-political ethics, Žižek, and 
more radical scholars like Rancière place politics at the center of their thought, especially 
some version of dissensus with, or disruption of, normal politics and/or the transgression of 
mainstream identities and political subjectivities. Key to the growing reception of these 
thinkers is not just the force of their ideas but also the resonance of this politics with emergent 
left political practice around the world, especially in the Occupy movement and, more recently, 
in South Africa in the #FeesMustFall protests on university campuses. 
 
In this article I engage with what I think is the key weakness of radical politics as political 
action at the expense of a vision of policy and institutional change. My key concern is how this 
politics, decoupled from policy and institutional vision, can further enable new forms of 
oppression, exclusion, and marginalization in reaction to dissent, a possibility evident now in 
Trump’s America and Brexit Britain, but long present in the Global South where democratic 
institutions and policies of social inclusion are more vulnerable to contestation. Indeed, there 
is much experience across the postcolonial world of the negative consequences of disrupting 
budding democratic institutions and policies, whether externally backed assassinations or 
coups, such as Lumumba in Zaire or Allende in Chile, or the capture of the state by predatory 
2 
 
elites in response to political crises in democracies (Thailand, Egypt, Mali), sometimes even 
with majority popular support, as in Turkey currently. 
 
In making this case I contrast the theoretical arguments of Jacques Rancière with those 
of the republican thinker Lawrence Hamilton, illustrating my claims through the example of 
the #FeesMustFall movement in South Africa. While Rancière is a clear exemplar of current 
radical political philosophy, Hamilton is less known, but a good object of comparison as he 
shares the radical political philosophical focus on politics over ethics and also embraces an 
aesthetic account of representation that echoes Rancière’s aesthetic account of politics. 
Notably, however, where Rancière begins his political analysis from an assumption of 
democracy as radical equality, Hamilton follows more Foucault’s argument about the 
inevitability of power relations between groups, and focuses on the republican concern on 
preventing power relations as domination. These diverse idealist versus realist starting points 
generate significantly different implications for political practice. Rancière’s approach 
emphasizes the primacy of political action to disrupt the political system in the name of 
radical equality, whereas Hamilton’s emphasizes more thinking through the policy and 
institutional alternatives that such action must produce to enhance collective freedom. 
 
While criticized for a lack of an explicit focus on politics in his work to date, I argue that 
Hamilton’s theory offers more by way of resources to secure sustainable social change for 
radical political practitioners than Rancière’s. This is because Hamilton’s theory forces us to 
think through the new forms of power desired after the riot, given the inevitable nature of 
power relations between groups, as well as offering an argument as to the conditions of 
freedom that need to be encoded in new institutions. Despite attempts by some like Norval to 
read into Rancière a more substantial politics through the notion of an ethos of inscription,2 
because of his profoundly normative starting point of democracy as radical equality Rancière 
remains too skeptical of the “police” to enable much practical politics other than disruption. 
Conversely, while Hamilton has yet to write explicitly about political action, I would suggest 
that inherent in his account are some key assumptions that would inform a real-world politics 
for freedom. 
 
This case is illustrated through the example of the #FeesMustFall movement that secured 
significant material and symbolic victories in the last few years, and which can also be framed 
in terms of a Rancièrian politics of disruption. Notably, however, #FeesMustFall remains a 
movement rather than an organization, and has failed to develop a substantial alternative 
policy and institutional vision, especially around student governance on campuses. This leaves 
the political party capture of student representation on South African campuses largely 
unchallenged, and #FeesMustFall without many natural allies among more moderate students 
and staff. Thus going forward it looks likely that not only might free higher education not be 
achieved, but the conditions for free student voice on campuses might be further constricted, 







Rancière,“Politics,” and the “Police” 
Rancière’s political philosophy starts from the assumption of democracy as radical equality 
as “there is no natural principle of domination by one person over another.”3 This principle 
serves as the radical point of critique of any self-proclaimed democracy that establishes a 
power hierarchy or inequality in power relations. Indeed, this principle forms the 
foundation of the distinction in Rancière’s thought between “politics” and the “police.” The 
latter, the “police”, refers to the totality of the social order, inclusive of everyone, all places and 
institutions. It is broader than the state, includes economic and social relations, and is a 
power hierarchy with a well-known and legitimated “distribution of the sensible.”4 This 
refers to a widely acknowledged and embraced view of the social order (what others might 
term the hegemonic worldview) that effectively limits what we term politics to problems of 
power and wealth in predefined social domains. 
 
For Rancière, however, real politics is the disruption of this commonly held “distribution of 
the sensible” and the domain of the police in the name of radical equality by “a part of those 
who have no part,” that is those who are unknown and marginalized from the “distribution 
of the sensible.”5 Importantly for Rancière, the “part that has no part” are not known or 
named before the act of disruption; it is only in the process of coming to political 
consciousness and naming themselves that the “part that has no part” comes to have a 
name. Thus, political dissensus extends not just to the act of disrupting existing institutions 
and practices but also to challenging the symbolic order. For Rancière then, real politics is 
not the clash between named groups, but when those unimagined by the social order 
disrupt its basic logic. It thus involves a deeper clash between “police” logic and egalitarian 
logic. At the same time, it is about constructing new political subjectivities through this 
process and thus requires a moment of “dis-identification” with the existing order and the 
establishment of a new name not recognized by the order through the process of collective 
action. Real politics is thus about a fundamental dissensus, not regular and recognizable 
conflict. It may well be uncommon, but can happen anywhere where rejection of the “police 
hierarchy” in the name of radical equality occurs. 
 
Perhaps because real politics cannot occur outside the “police,” as no place exists, Rancière 
characterizes the spaces of politics as “in-between spaces,” or “intervals of subjectification,” 
“constructed between identities, between spaces and places.” Thus “political being-together 
is being-between: between identities, between worlds.”6 Notably, these spaces do no preexist 
the political but are created through it. In this regard, Bassett notes that Rancière is very 
critical of Marxism, which he sees as defining the truth about politics (economic relations) as 
outside the political process itself, and rejects any grand postcapitalist vision in favor of 
those “communist moments”—when workers succeeded, however locally and fleetingly, in 
collectivizing the power of anyone with everyone.7 
 
Thus, while Rancière explicitly eschews any reflection on postcapitalist institutions or what an 
egalitarian future might look like, Basset argues that he stands close to the interstitial politics 




operating in the cracks and spaces within dominant structures of power.”8 However, it is not a 
form of politics that affirms the local communitarianism of some kinds of anarchism, as it 
always returns to the fundamental principle of radical equality in governance.9 
 
Although by now it is clear that, as Norval characterizes it, Rancière’s view of democracy is 
one of rupture rather than the rival view of democracy as routinized change, she nevertheless 
argues that there is more to his politics than disruption.10 While noting that Rancière is 
deeply suspicious of inscription leading to inclusion into some form of the “police,” thus 
violating the principle of radical equality, Norval argues for an ethos of egalitarian inscription 
that can be derived from Rancière’s writings. Based on exemplars that bridge disruption 
and inscription in his historical work, Norval suggests that a Rancièrian-style inscription 
would include: the declaration of wrong including “the naming of hitherto unnamed 
subjects,” “the reclaiming of a given name,” “the staging of a wrong that seeks to 
reconfigure the sensible,” “the imagining of other possibilities,” and “and seeing the universal 
in the singular.”11 
 
In short, however, even on the most generous readings by Basset and Norval, what remains 
for Rancière after the riot is at best an ethos with which to approach inscription, but one 
grounded in a rejection of any reform that inscribes new forms of hierarchy in violation of 
radical equality. This is a view of politics as constant disruption of the “police” rather than of 
one of incremental change or institutional reform. It is, however, a kind of politics that is 
both possible and even affective as demonstrated in the following account of the 
#FeesMustFall movement in South Africa. 
 
Rancière and #FeesMustFall 
In what follows I will outline my reading of the #FeesMustFall politics over the last three 
years, particularly in the campus on which I work, identifying some remarkable 
resonances with Rancière’s account of politics and the police. Importantly, this is not an 
analysis based on the self-understanding(s) of the #FeesMustFall movement, nor an 
attempt to impose a Rancièrian frame on this politics in order to claim deeper 
understanding of #FeesMustFall. Rather, the #FeesMustFall case is used to illustrate larger 
claims about the strength and weaknesses of competing accounts of radical politics found in 
Rancière and Hamilton, especially in the developing world. These points are critical to make 
in a South African context where the decolonization of intellectual life is currently a leading 
debate. Indeed, my argument is intended to contribute to this debate by demonstrating the 
costs of an uncritical importation of radical philosophical thought in conditions common 
across the Global South. 
 
The #FeesMustFall movement began in 2015 as a student movement mostly about free 
higher education. The issue of fees and the financial exclusion of poor students has been an 
issue on the higher education landscape in South Africa since 1994, but has grown in 
significance with the relative decline in state support for higher education, an economic 




material conditions saw the proposed increase in fees by universities met with protest that 
was quickly nationalized in 2015. As suggested by the hashtag identity of #FeesMustFall, 
social media was a key instrument in the spread of the protest, and indeed, there are many 
more hashtags, both nationally (#FreeEducation) and on each campus (#RhodesMustFall, 
#UWCFeesMustFall) and by year (#FeesMustFall2016). For the purposes of this article, I will 
use #FeesMustFall to represent all of these. 
 
Notably, the initiative for #FeesMustFall started at the Universities of Cape Town, 
Johannesburg, and Rhodes, three of the original eight historically white Universities under 
apartheid, but extended across most of the 26 universities in the country. In addition to free 
education, demands included the racial transformation of staff and student bodies, the 
decolonization of the Western knowledge inherent in higher education, the insourcing of 
university workers, removing private security and the police from campuses, as well as a 
range of local issues from residence conditions to library hours, Internet access, and the 
like. The ensuing negotiations between students and university administration  dragged  on  
with little progress while protest escalated, leading to the disruption of classes, protest 
marches to parliament in Cape Town and the ANC head office in Johannesburg. Events 
culminated in a march on the home of government, the Union Buildings in Pretoria, in 
October 2015, where President Zuma announced there would be no increase in fees for 2016. 
 
Marred by a series of violent confrontations, the march on the Union Buildings effectively 
marked the end of #FeesMustFall until the following year, when the pattern repeated itself as 
universities announced various fee increases for 2017. While protest and confrontation did not 
reach quite the same levels as in 2016, there were many instances of violent conflict between 
police and protestors, and by the end of the year government announced that it would subside 
university increases of up to 8 percent, effectively maintaining a 0 percent increase again as 
universities did not go past the 8 percent mark. In addition, many historically white 
universities have embarked on attempts to accelerate the racial transformation of the staff 
profile, and are engaging in efforts to decolonize the curriculum. For many academics, 
including myself, the intellectual challenge posed by the call for the decolonization of 
knowledge has been an important and transformative one. 
 
Despite these gains, by the end of 2016 the #FeesMustFall movement was beginning to show 
significant cracks, not least as following the march to Union Building in 2015, the leading 
national student organization, SASCO (South African Students Congress), came under 
pressure from the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), to which it is aligned, to 
demobilize protest. On some campuses, such as the one on which I work, this led to split in the 
#FeesMustFall movement between the Student Representative Council (SRC), the elected 
representative structure for students controlled by SASCO, and others in the movement. This 
tension endured into 2016, undermining the common ground for student mobilization, and 
leading to more radical elements taking a leading role in the movement—at least on my 
campus.12 While different dynamics were manifest on different campuses around the country, 




increasingly associated with anti-ANC political parties such as the Economic Freedom 
Fighters (EFF) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). 
 
To my mind the rise of partisan politics and its polarizing effect on the #FeesMustFall 
movement is actually a return to what Rancière would term the “police” order of higher 
education institutions, as student representation on almost every campus across the country 
is dominated by political parties. As is the case more widely in Africa,13 student politics is as 
much a training ground for aspirant politicians, both ANC and opposition political parties, 
as it is a forum for student voice. Not only are most candidates for office from campus 
branches of political parties, but also on campuses like the one I work on, the electoral 
system is a proportional representation party-list system. Students do not vote for 
candidates but political parties, and the parties choose the student representatives.14 As is 
widely observed, the proportional representation system comes with significant 
accountability deficits, as representatives’ account to the party not to the electorate.15 Thus 
party identification allows student leaders access to political identities and ideologies readily 
identifiable by students but comes with the risk of orientation to national issues and party 
interests rather than local student concerns. Much of the time this is probably not a 
significant risk—until national political party and student interests’ conflict as with the 
#FeesMustFall movement. 
 
Hopefully by now it is clear how the #FeesMustFall movement can be framed in terms of a 
radical politics based on disruption in the name of radical equality. This is evident in 
#FeesMustFall’s egalitarian demands, its confrontational style, and its constitution as a 
movement rather than an organization. Thus, partly to avoid repression,16 but partly also to 
give expression to notions of radical equality, #FeesMustFall has pursued decision-making 
through public meetings and through different leaders, some elected at meetings, some not, 
who engage with the university administration at different times. #FeesMustFall’s great 
strength in conceiving itself as a movement and not an organization is that it can be invoked 
by any group of students large enough to mobilize in its name. This gives it an organic but 
nonstructured character that means it struggles to engage in any forum other than the 
protest or the mass meeting. Thus #FeesMustFall has refused to stand for student office and it 
lacks a clear internal organizational structure and hierarchy. 
 
If so inclined, one could read into the practice of #FeesMustFall many of the features of 
Rancièrian politics, especially the confrontation of the logic of the “police” with demands for 
radical equality. In addition one could point to the tactics of disordering the university; dis-
identifying with formal student representation, party politics, and for many, the Mandela 
“rainbow nation” compromise of 1994. One could also point to #FeesMustFall’s nature as an 
“insubstantial community,” that is, a collective but not a unity; the affirmation of the 
unpredictable subject in the style and symbolism of the movement; and the seeking for new 
imaginings of the university and the country. All of this exemplifies democracy as disruption, 
and arguably redeems it as a form of bringing significant social change, not least the 




even more significantly the attempt by the higher education sector to engage the challenge of 
decolonizing its practices of teaching and researching. 
 
At the same time however, #FeesMustFall is a great example of the limitations of “democracy 
as disruption” in policy, institutional, and political terms. In policy terms, #FeesMustFall 
has been reluctant to engage in debates about the practical mechanisms for the funding of 
higher education. Indeed it has also not undertaken to develop a substantive vision of what 
a transformed and decolonized university sector would look like, and while this is partly 
because decolonization is in significant part about building alternative forms of knowledge 
that do not yet exist, it is also because #FeesMustFall is a movement rather than an 
organization. An ironic shortcoming of not being an organization, and the politics of 
democracy as disruption more widely, is the failure to engage specifically with the 
institutional design of student governance on campuses. This is critical as the very existence 
of #FeesMustFall is a performative critique of the failure of formal representation to bring 
pro-student change, and a key reason for this is the capture of student representation by 
party politics. Thus not only is this capture not addressed by a failure to call for the reform 
of student representative institutions, but party influence over student politics may well 
help undermine the conditions for future mobilization and disruption on many university 
campuses. With most SRCs led by the ANC aligned SASCO (South African Students 
Congress), it is not hard to imagine an alliance between formal student leaders and 
university administrators as #FeesMustFall popularity begins to wane. 
 
This brings us to #FeesMustFall’s politics of disruption, which, while effective when able to 
mobilize enough students, has targeted universities mostly rather than the state, even 
though universities cannot meet the demands of the movement on their own. The consequence 
has been to divide the student body, many of whom wanted to finish the academic year and 
did not appreciate having classes disrupted through the threat of violence, and to alienate 
many academic and support staff who felt torn between a duty to students and the principle 
of free education. Indeed, free education is probably the one cause in South Africa that could 
have united the vast majority of people working in the sector had the politics of 
#FeesMustFall not only been about disruption, but also about alliance-building. Thus 
while we can expect protest to continue in the name of free education in the near future, it 
seems likely that it will be increasingly the preserve of an extreme minority on campuses. 
 
Lastly, this analysis of the efficacy of democratic politics as disruption by #FeesMustFall echoes 
larger debates about models of social change in South African society. Steve Robins contrasts 
the “spectacular” politics of the Seskhona people’s movement in Cape Town with the “slow 
activism” of the Social Justice Coalition (SJC).17 While both organizations are concerned with 
the plight of poor people in the city, especially as regards sanitation, Robins points to the 
limited dividends of spectacular politics alone. Thus, Seskhona secured great attention for the 
issue of sanitation by dumping human waste at the airport and “poo-flinging” at government 
buildings, but has no clear policy or institutional proposals; their confrontational approach 




Notably, key Seskhona leaders later joined their former enemy, the DA (Democratic Alliance) 
party, which rules the City of Cape Town.19 
 
By contrast, the Social Justice Coalition (SJC) combines spectacular politics of protest with 
other forms of activism, including building alliances with other rights-based organizations 
using the constitution and law to hold government accountable. Also important are its clear 
proposals for policy and institutional change to improve sanitation for the poor in Cape 
Town. This “slow activism” Robins observes has seen significant increases in budget expenditure 
and changes in practices by the city that benefit the poor, albeit incrementally. As Robins 
points out, this is a politics with a long history in South Africa, best represented in the united 
front presented against apartheid by unions and civil society formations in the late 1980s. Real 
change, he suggests, is better approached through this “slow activism” model. 
 
Hamilton, Power, and the Politics of Disruption 
My argument so far is that framing democracy as disruption alone, divorced from policy 
and institutional questions a la Rancière, amounts to a poor model for effective social 
change in the Global South. Indeed, under certain conditions disruptive politics might 
provoke reactions that make society more exclusionary and less democratic. Hopefully the 
case of #FeesMustFall has illustrated both the strengths but also the weaknesses of a radical 
politics as only disruption or the spectacular. A better and more practical model is to link 
disruption to policy and institutional goals, as articulated in Robins’s account of “slow 
activism”—notably, a long-standing tradition in popular politics in South Africa. In 
addition to prudential grounds, however, there are good theoretical grounds for preferring 
slow activism to spectacular politics—and grounds that do not jettison the idea of the 
dissensus. For these it is to Lawrence Hamilton that I turn. 
 
In his 2015 book, Freedom Is Power, Lawrence Hamilton offers a theory of freedom that 
shares the agonistic assumptions of radical theorists but locates this in a realist empirical 
account of power and politics inspired by Machiavelli. Thus unlike Rancière, who begins with 
the normative assumption of democracy as radical equality, Hamilton begins with the 
realistic account of modern society as characterized by a deep division of labor under 
some version of liberal-democratic capitalism. This gives rise to attendant power relations 
that define various groups, usually with contending understandings of their interests. 
Consequently, politics has a group character as power relations are understood to shape 
patterns of inclusion and exclusion; it is contentious, as groups often understand 
themselves as having competing interests or identities; and it necessarily involves an 
element of representation given the self-understanding of society as comprised of contending 
groups. 
 
Unlike Rancière, who is focused on the ideal of democratic equality to which no version of 
the “police” can give full expression, Hamilton is inspired by the republican concern with 
ending domination and the inevitability of some unequal relations of power. He is, however, 




avoiding repression, we can indeed become free enough to identify, pursue, and secure our 
needs and rights. Thus, Hamilton’s starting point is methodologically and substantively the 
opposite of Rancière’s. It is empirical rather than normative, and it assumes that the radical 
equality in power between individuals that Rancière desires is impossible. Indeed, this is 
not the important question; the real question is what do we need in power terms to be free? 
Further, in leaving open the question of what power relations shape what groups and vice 
versa, Hamilton enables a broader frame of analysis than Rancière, for whom the “police” is 
shaped fundamentally by capitalist relations. Perhaps on Hamilton’s account there is more 
room for critical race theorists and radical feminists to articular forms of exclusion other 
than the economic. 
 
In developing his theory of “freedom is power”, Hamilton argues that we individually and 
collectively need access to four kinds of power under modern conditions: the power to 
overcome individual obstacles, the power to resist social convention, the power to choose 
our representatives, and the power to shape the economic and social environment through 
our representatives. Freedom is both an individual and group problem, and as it is a group 
problem, shaped as these are by power relations, it necessarily involves various forms of 
representation. Furthermore, Hamilton invokes the aesthetic conception of representation, 
which implies the construction of reality through the political act rather than prior to it. Thus 
it is up to us to decide which accounts of groups and power relations resonate with our 
experiences of reality and endorse these through politics: that is: voting, engaging on social 
media, participating in protest, joining organizations and so on. Last, realizing freedom is a 
policy and institutional problem, as suggested by the idea that freedom requires the power 
to shape our economic and social environment through our representatives. Indeed, 
following Machiavelli, Hamilton holds that a key condition of freedom is the inclusion of 
contending groups at the heart of formal decision-making and giving them enough power to 
prevent tyranny or domination by one key group. While policies and institutions are not all 
there is to Hamilton’s account of freedom is power, they are necessary to it. 
 
A key criticism of Hamilton’s account is that it lacks sufficient engagement with politics and 
is overly concerned with institutions, as suggested by the conclusion of Freedom Is Power 
(2015) where, by way of provocation, he offers some ideas for institutional reform. This has 
led to many to see Hamilton as falling into the “democracy as institutional reform” camp as 
opposed to the “democracy as disruption” camp. While this criticism is not without 
foundation, I think Hamilton offers more by way of a politics that links democracy as 
disruption to democracy as institutional reform than is commonly observed. I want to 
suggest that there are three elements inherent in his account that offer a basis for a more 
thorough account of politics that could ground practices like Robins’s “slow activism.” These 
three elements are drawn from the central role of representation to politics, the aesthetic 
framing of politics and the substantive political commitments implied in his four domains of 
freedom. 
 
Perhaps the obvious focus and strength of Hamilton’s account is a clear link, commonly made 




Hamilton’s four-fold schema through the requirement to choose our representatives and to 
influence the wider social and economic environment through these representatives. Thus 
in the case of #FeesMustFall, an awareness of the centrality of formal representatives to 
politics would inevitably highlight the issue of student governance on campus and, among 
other things, its relationship to party control. A political movement reflecting on who gets to 
speak for whom on what issues, including framing who the “who” is, that is, shaping political 
subjectivity, would have almost inevitably drawn links between student interests, student 
government and party capture, and the need for radical reform. 
 
The second aspect of Hamilton’s work that underpins an account of politics is his aesthetic 
framing of representation. Indeed, there is much in Hamilton’s account of the politics of 
aesthetic representation and contending groups that overlaps with the forms of 
“disidentification,” invoking of new identities, resisting social conventions, and affirmation of 
conflict over consensus that characterizes Rancière’s account of politics. Unlike Rancière 
though, Hamilton has not developed this systematically and reflexively, and could pay more 
attention to the links between conflict, identity, and social norms and aesthetic 
representation than he does currently in Freedom Is Power. However, this is yet to be 
explicitly done, and that should not be read as denying the existence of resources for this 
kind of talk. It is in the conjoining of Hamilton’s idea of aesthetic representation with the first 
two conditions of freedom is power, namely the overcoming of personal obstacles and 
resisting social conventions that the resources for a similar account of the symbolic dimensions 
of freedom of power lie. 
 
I would suggest that implicit in Hamilton’s four-fold conception of freedom is power are 
substantive commitments around conditions of free speech and appeals to reason and truth 
that inform political vision. A free society, thus, is one in which, under modern conditions, 
certain substantive rights must exist for individuals and groups to exercise power across 
Hamilton’s four dimensions. The overcoming of personal obstacles implies the lack of 
oppressive instruments by the state (and others); the resisting of community convention 
implies conventional civil liberties such as freedom of thought and religion and political 
liberties such as free speech; the power to choose representatives assume liberties such as the 
right to form organizations, parties, and to vote; the power to influence economic and social 
environment through representatives implies debate on key policies. 
 
Hamilton’s examples of institutional reform in the conclusion make it clear that he imagines 
all of this as agonistic politics—that is, as democratic and requiring the use of argument but 
not consensus driven. A key element of this is the power of contending groups to veto the 
power of their rivals to oppress them. Consequently, when conjoined with a commitment to 
greater freedom for groups, these conditions of civil and political liberty, truth testing and 
rational judgment offer collective grounds for measuring political progress. The extent to 
which a reform enhances either the conditions for representative politics or the 
empowerment of key social groups in the political process is the extent to which progress 
toward freedom is made. This offers political movements metrics by which to define and 





Returning to the case of #FeesMustFall, we can use the frame emergent from my reading of 
Hamilton to evaluate both the demands of the movement and its strategy and tactics in 
terms of enhancing the conditions for these progressive politics, in particular the 
opportunities for control by self-identifying groups to challenge what they perceive as 
exclusionary power relations. The issue is not just about the event, the disruption, or the riot, 
but also about the challenge of ongoing politics in the policy and the institutional domain of 
higher-education institutions. After the riot is over, will marginalized groups be able to 
influence politics in freedom-enhancing directions, or will there be a backlash that further 
excludes poor black students from higher education? Empirical research suggests that 
sustainable social change requires answering all these questions, and in contrast to 
Rancière and other advocates of democracy as disruption, Hamilton provides theoretical 
resources to engage with all these questions. 
 
Conclusion 
The case of the #FeesMustFall student movement in South Africa suggests that disruption 
without a well-developed vision of social change runs the risk of making things worse rather 
than better. Hence despite its impressive gains in limiting fee increases in higher education 
nationally for two years in a row, and prompting institutions to reflect on the need to 
decolonize knowledge, #FeesMustFall has simultaneously failed to transform the system of 
student representation and university governance in the higher education sector. Driven by 
the angry logic of spectacular politics, #FeesMustFall has been unwilling to compromise and 
reluctant to negotiate. It has refused to become an organization and been incapable of 
building alliances with more moderate students, staff, and workers in the sector. 
Consequently, over the next few years the movement is likely to dwindle while university 
governance becomes more securitized, student representation more partisan, and university 
decision-making more exclusive. 
 
Emblematic of “spectacular” versus “slow” activism more widely in South Africa, the case of 
#FeesMustFall reflects the theoretical imperative to think beyond democracy as disruption, 
and take seriously the imperative to differentiate different kinds of “police..” While Rancière’s 
normative assumptions of radical equality flattens the “police” into one form of exclusion that 
does violence to the different degrees and characters of inclusion and exclusion that shape 
political systems around the world, Hamilton’s empirical starting point of the inevitability 
of power relations between groups, and the importance of differentiation freedom-
enhancing from domineering ones, produces significantly different approaches to politics. 
Central here is the valorization of disruption as the only legitimate form of politics by 
radical theorists with little by means of further inscription contrasted with the republican 
view that true equality is never fully possible, and indeed chimeric to pursue. What really 
matters for the latter, is that we are able to escape domination and design institutions that 
limit the potential abuse of power. 
 
Indeed, in this regard Hamilton is more optimistic than most republicans are, as he affirms 




domains to identify, pursue, and secure their needs and rights. In addition, Hamilton 
frames representation in the aesthetic sense of a creative act, thus affirming that group 
formation is not something prior to the political process, but rather is claimed and 
presented through the political process. This happens in the mainstream and social media, 
in daily life, in civil society, in elections, parliament, and in the courts. Politics is thus a power 
struggle between groups, but one that is constructed through political discourse and debate 
across society as a whole, not just in the halls of power. Lastly, against those who tend to see 
Hamilton as falling only or primarily into the “democracy as institutions” camp, this article 
argues for an account of politics drawn from three elements in Hamilton thought: the 
central role of representation to politics, the aesthetic framing of politics, and the substantive 
political commitments implied in his four domains of freedom. 
 
In short, whether or not one agrees with Hamilton’s political thought, it can provide a 
theoretical basis for taking seriously both political action as well as policy and institutional 
reform. It also suggests, returning to Norval’s contrast, that democracy is nether fully about 
disruption nor institutional reform but some combination of both. Thus, in contrast to 
Rancière, who theorizes “spectacular politics” exclusively, Hamilton offers theoretical 
resources for a “slow activism” that includes both the riot and the policy activism and 
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